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TORT LAW-GENERAL RELEASE FORMS-THE FREE RIDE
FOR JOINT TORTFEASORS IS OVER. Moore v. Missouri Pacific
Railroad, 299 Ark. 232, 773 S.W.2d 78 (1989).
On September 13, 1984, an automobile driven by Mary A. Rich-
ardson collided with a train, owned and operated by Missouri Pacific
Railroad, in Benton, Arkansas. Mary Richardson was killed in-
stantly. The passenger in the car, Winnie Ruth Thomas, was seri-
ously injured.
On September 25, 1984, an insurance adjuster representing Mary
Richardson's liability carrier, Sentry Insurance,' visited Winnie
Thomas' son, W. Lee Moore, in the hospital where Thomas was a
patient. The adjuster told Moore that Mary Richardson only had
$25,000 in liability insurance coverage and that "it was the most they
could get so they might as well go ahead and settle."2 Acting on this
advice and without benefit of counsel, Lee Moore executed the release
of Mary Richardson on behalf of Winnie Thomas on October 24,
1984. 3 Moore was acting under power of attorney given to him by
Winnie Thomas on October 2, 1984.4
In addition to the name Mary A. Richardson, the release exe-
cuted by Lee Moore purported to release the following: "his succes-
sors and assigns, and/or his, her, their heirs, executors and
administrators, and also any and all other persons, associations and
corporations, whether herein named or referred to or not, and who,
together with the above named, may be jointly or severally liable to
the Undersigned, of and from any and all, and all manner of, actions
and causes of action, rights, suits, covenants, contracts, agreements,
judgments, claims and demands whatsoever in law or equity...." 5
Winnie Ruth Thomas died on May 15, 1985. Her surviving
heirs, Lee Moore and Shirley Barnett, filed suit against Missouri Pa-
cific Railroad and John C. Peterson, Jr., the conductor of the train
which struck Thomas, claiming that the railroad's failure to properly
maintain the crossing and Peterson's negligence caused the injuries




5. Id. at 233, 773 S.W.2d at 78-79 (emphasis added).
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and ultimate death of Thomas.6 On November 24, 1986, Missouri
Pacific Railroad and Peterson filed a motion for summary judgment
arguing that the benefit of the release executed by Moore inured to
Missouri Pacific Railroad and Peterson, and thus, they should incur
no liability.7 The trial court agreed and granted the motion.
Before the Arkansas Supreme Court, Moore and Barnett con-
tended that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment be-
cause the general release, containing the phrase "any and all persons,
associations and corporations, whether herein named or referred to or
not,"8 executed by Moore relinquishing a claim against Mary Rich-
ardson, was not effective to discharge Missouri Pacific Railroad and
Peterson. The Arkansas Supreme Court agreed.9 Moore v. Missouri
Pacific Railroad, 299 Ark. 232, 773 S.W.2d 78 (1989).
At common law, the release of one joint tortfeasor released the
other because there was, in the eyes of the court, but one actionable
cause against the two which was surrendered by the release. 10 Courts
justly criticized this result because it forced the plaintiff to either
forego the opportunity of obtaining a settlement from one defendant
without filing suit, or to give up the entire right against the other
without receiving just compensation.' 
To avoid this harsh result, courts developed the covenant not to
sue. The covenant allowed a court, without depending on the enact-
ment of statutes, to retreat from the common law rule that release of
one joint tortfeasor discharged all other joint tortfeasors. 2 The cove-
nant not to sue was not an abandonment or relinquishment of the
right or claim, "but merely an agreement not to enforce an existing
cause of action."' 13 This device arose from the sheer desire of never
depriving a plaintiff his cause of action."
Common law releases in Arkansas followed much the same his-
torical development as did the majority of jurisdictions. In Jones v.
6. Id. at 234, 773 S.W.2d at 79.
7. Id. In response to the motion for summary judgment, Moore and Barnett submitted
an affidavit executed by Moore stating that his intent was not to release any party other than
Mary Richardson. Moore and Barnett also filed an affidavit signed by a reading teacher, Jerri




10. See generally W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWENS, PROSSER AND KEE-
TON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 49 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
11. Id.
12. Hicklin v. Anders, 201 Or. 128,. 135-36, 253 P.2d 897, 899-900 (1953).
13. Pellett v. Sonotone Corp., 26 Cal. 2d 705, 711-12, 160 P.2d 783, 787 (1945).
14. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 10.
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Chism 11 the court held that "[w]herever the person injured by the
wrong of several joint tort feasors has settled his claim for damages,
and received satisfaction from one of them, the cause of action is dis-
charged as to all."' 6 Arkansas courts also recognized the covenant
not to sue. 17
The Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (UCATA)
was drafted in 1939.18 Section four of the UCATA provides that the
release of one joint tortfeasor did not discharge the other joint
tortfeasor unless the release so provided.' 9 This provision changed
the common law rule under which a release to one released all
others. 2° Arkansas adopted the UCATA in 1941,21 and seventeen
other states have also adopted the Act.22 The court in Moore identi-
fied two additional states which have adopted section four of the
UCATA.23
A review of judicial interpretations of the UCATA from the
adopting jurisdictions reveals quite diverse results. Three different
views 24 emerge as to whether the release of a single tortfeasor accom-
15. 73 Ark. 14, 83 S.W. 315 (1904).
16. Id. at 15, 83 S.W. at 316 (quoting 1 JAGGARD ON TORTS § 117). See also Magnolia
Petroleum Co. v. McFall, 178 Ark. 596, 12 S.W.2d 15 (1928) (re-affirming the Jones decision).
17. Texarkana Tel. Co. v. Pemberton, 86 Ark. 329, 336, 111 S.W. 257, 260 (1908). "A
covenant not to sue one of two joint tortfeasors does not operate as a release of the other from
liability." Id.
18. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-NINTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE 243 (1939).
19. Id. at 246.
20. Id. "Since this result may be avoided anyhow by giving a covenant not to sue instead
of a release, it was thought wise to obviate what must frequently be considered a technical
pitfall by an injured person who releases one of two or more joint tortfeasors for a certain sum,
presumably approximately the released person's share of the damage, intending to pursue his
claim against the others." Id.
21. 1941 Ark. Acts 315 §§ I to 12 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-61-201 to 212
(1987)).
22. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT, 12 U.L.A. 72 (Supp. 1990).
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-2501 to 2509 (Supp. 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-50.5-
101 to 106 (Repl. 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6301 to 6308 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 768.31 (West 1986); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 663-11 to 17 (Supp. 1989); MD. ANN. CODE art.
50 §§ 16 to 24 (Repl. 1986); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231B, §§ I to 4 (West 1986); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17.225 to 305 (Michie 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-3-1 to 8 (Repl.
1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ lB-1 to 6 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-38-01 to 04 (Repl.
1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2307.31 to .33 (Anderson Supp. 1989); 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 8321 to 8327 (Purdon 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 10-6-1 to 11 (1985); S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 15-38-10 to 70 (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 15-8-11 to 22
(1984); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-11-101 to 106 (Repl. 1980).
23. IDAHO CODE § 6-805 (1979) and ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, para. 302 (Smith-Hurd
1989). 299 Ark. 232, 235, 773 S.W.2d 78, 79 (1989).
24. See generally Annotation, Release of One Joint Tortfeasor as Discharging Liability of
Others: Modern Trends, 73 A.L.R.2d 403 (1960).
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panied by a boilerplate release of "all other persons, associations and
corporations, whether herein named or referred to or not, ' 25 dis-
charges all tortfeasors. 26 There is neither a clear majority nor a de-
tectable trend of preferring one view over the others.
The first approach is to look at the intention of the parties to the
release. The Colorado Supreme Court held that "the 'intent' rule
most nearly comports with existing Colorado case law and most effec-
tively promotes the purpose and spirit of the UCATA. ' 28 The justifi-
cation for the "intent" rule derives from the potential for confusion in
general release forms which attempt to release the world as well as the
settling tortfeasor.29 Other states recognized the far-reaching conse-
quences that an injured plaintiff would suffer if the execution of a
general release discharged all potential defendants. 30 For these rea-
sons, it is imperative that the releasor's intent be clearly expressed.3"
The mere signing of a printed form which happens to contain broad,
general release language, in addition to providing spaces for the spe-
cifically discharged parties, is insufficient to provide a clear manifesta-
tion of intent.32
Tennessee also favors the "intent" rule. 33 Since the 1968 adop-
tion of the UCATA in Tennessee,3 4 a general release form is only
effective to release all joint tortfeasors if it is so intended by the relea-
sor.
3 5 The desirability of the "intent" rule is two-fold. It prevents the
harsh consequences that the general release can have upon an unsus-
pecting plaintiff without imposing the burden of specifically naming
or identifying every tortfeasor to be discharged. 36 The releasor's in-
tent may be demonstrated by extrinsic evidence. 7
Another interpretation of the UCATA is the "specific identity"
rule. Under this rule, the statutory phrase "unless the release so pro-
vides" requires that a release either expressly name or otherwise spe-
25. Moore, 299 Ark. at 233, 773 S.W.2d at 78.
26. Annotation, supra, note 24.
27. Neves v. Potter, 769 P.2d 1047 (Colo. 1989) (en banc).
28. Id. at 1053.
29. Chakov v. Outboard Marine Corp., 429 A.2d 984, 985 (Del. 1981).
30. Hurt v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 380 So. 2d 432, 433 (Fla. 1980).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 434. See also McInnis v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 625 F. Supp. 943 (D.R.I.
1986).
33. See Kreutzmann v. Bauman, 609 S.W.2d 736 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).
34. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-11-101 to 106 (Repl. 1980).
35. Kreutzmann, 609 S.W.2d at 738.




cifically identify or describe any tortfeasor to be discharged.38 Broad
general language like "all other persons, associations and corpora-
tions, whether herein named or referred to or not,"39 is insufficient.'
Young v. State4 1 illustrates the "specific identity" rule. In Young
the plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle driven by Edward Krivak42
who lost control of his car and crashed.43 Young filed a personal in-
jury action against Krivak, Peter Kiewit Sons Company, and the
State of Alaska." Approximately one year after filing the suit, Young
executed a release of Krivak in return for three thousand dollars.45
The release in part contained the following language: "[T]he Under-
signed ... does hereby ... discharge ... all other persons, corpora-
tions, firms, associations or partnerships .... ,46 The Alaska Supreme
Court held that because the release did not specifically mention Peter
Kiewit or the State of Alaska, it did not effectively discharge them.47
The underlying justification for the "specific identity" rule is that
it brings the most clarity to the conflicting release rules and minimizes
the possibility of a releasor being misled.48 The releasee does not have
to be named. Specifically identifying or describing the tortfeasor is
sufficient.49 For example, a release could meet the statutory require-
ment by describing the releasee as "the driver of the car which struck
the motorcycle. '
The "flat-bar" rule is a third approach to construing the statu-
tory phrase, "unless the release so provides."'" Under this rule, the
boilerplate language releasing "all other persons, associations and cor-
porations, whether herein named or referred to or not,"52 discharges
38. Beck v. Cianchetti, 1 Ohio St. 3d 231, 235, 439 N.E.2d 417, 420 (1982).
39. Moore v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 299 Ark. 232, 233, 773 S.W.2d 78, 78 (1989).
40. Beck, 1 Ohio St. 3d at 235, 439 N.E.2d at 420.
41. 455 P.2d 889 (Alaska 1969).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. Young alleged that Krivak was negligent in his operation of the car. Peter Kiewit
Sons Company was the prime contractor under contract with the State of Alaska for the con-
struction of the road where the accident occurred. Young alleged that Peter Kiewit Sons
Company and the State of Alaska were negligent for failing to post proper warnings of the
single lane bridge where the accident occurred. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 890.
47. Id. at 893.
48. Id.
49. Beck v. Cianchetti, 1 Ohio St. 3d 231, 235, 439 N.E.2d 417, 420 (1982).
50. Id.
51. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-61-204 (1987).
52. Moore, 299 Ark. at 233, 773 S.W.2d at 78.
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all joint tortfeasors.1 In Buttermore v. Aliquippa Hospital54 the court
held that the parties to a release may settle their differences in terms
that are suitable to them." It is their responsibility to include or ex-
clude terms 6 such as a reservation of the right to sue a joint
tortfeasor. By placing the burden on the parties to the agreement, the
literal language of their agreement is binding absent a showing of
fraud, accident, or mutual mistake. 7 Other courts enforce the literal
language of the release by prohibiting the introduction of extrinsic
evidence absent a claim of ambiguity. 8
Many other jurisdictions have adopted provisions similar to the
UCATA. As in the UCATA states, judicial interpretation of these
provisions varies. In Texas, for example, a joint tortfeasor can claim
the benefit of the release only if it refers to him by name or with such
descriptive particularity that his connection with the tortious event is
undoubted.59 This is comparable to the "specific identity" rule. The
District of Columbia Court of Appeals, on the other hand, held that
the general release form was ambiguous and allowed extrinsic evi-
dence to determine the parties subjective intent." Some non-UCATA
jurisdictions, such as Missouri, adhere to the "flat-bar" rule.61
The history of section four of the UCATA in Arkansas is sparse
at best. Since Arkansas adopted the UCATA in 1941,62 three federal
circuits63 have construed the meaning of section four.'
53. See Ralkey v. Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co., 63 Md. App. 515, 492 A.2d 1358
(1985); Johnson v. City of Las Cruces, 86 N.M. 196, 521 P.2d 1037 (1974);,Buttermore v.
Aliquippa Hosp., 522 Pa. 325, 561 A.2d 733 (1989).
54. 522 Pa. 325, 561 A.2d 733 (1989).
55. Id. at 329, 561 A.2d at 735.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Johnson v. City of Las Cruces, 86 N.M. 196, 197, 521 P.2d 1037, 1038 (1974).
59. Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 420 (Tex. 1984). For a discussion,
see Comment, "Sooner or Later" Is Now, 36 BAYLOR L. REV. 429 (1984).
60. Lamphier v. Washington Hosp. Center, 524 A.2d 729, 732 (D.C. 1987). See also
Bjork v. Chrysler Corp., 702 P.2d 146 (Wyo. 1985). "[T]he burden is upon those who are not
parties to the release and have made no payment toward satisfaction of the claim, to
(a) establish that the parties intended that they be discharged by producing proof to that effect
or (b) prove the releasor has received full compensation." Id. at 156.
61. See Liberty v. J.A. Tobin Constr. Co., 512 S.W.2d 886 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974).
62. 1941 Ark. Acts 315, § 4 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-61-204 (1987)).
63. Douglas v, United States Tobacco Co., 670 F.2d 791 (8th Cir. 1982); Morison v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 428 F.2d 952 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 904 (1970); Allbright Bros.,
Contractors, Inc., v. Hull-Dobbs Co., 209 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1953).
64. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-61-204 (1987) provides that:
[a] release by the injured person of one (1) joint tortfeasor, whether before or after
judgment, does not discharge the other tortfeasors unless the release so provides; but
reduces the claim against the other tortfeasors in the amount of the consideration
RELEASE FORMS
The Sixth Circuit provided the first interpretation of section 16-
61-204 in Allbright Bros., Contractors, Inc. v. Hull-Dobbs Co.65 All-
bright involved an action by one tortfeasor, the appellant, for contri-
bution against joint tortfeasors after judgments were entered upon a
settlement agreement between the appellant and the injured parties.
The appellant contended that the settlements and judgments satisfied
the claims of the injured parties and therefore released the joint
tortfeasors from liability. 66 Construing section 34-1004 of the Arkan-
sas Statutes Annotated, 67 the court held that the release did not dis-
charge the joint tortfeasors because the release agreement did not
name them.68
The Fifth Circuit in Morison v. General Motors Corporations
69
addressed the question of whether, in Arkansas, a general release con-
taining the language "all other persons, firms or corporations liable or
who might be claimed to be liable"70 was effective to discharge all
joint tortfeasors. The court held that it was. 71 The plaintiff executed
a release for the sum of $10,000 to the driver and owner of the car in
which he was a passenger at the time of the accident.72 Subsequent to
the execution of the release, the plaintiff filed an action 73 against Gen-
eral Motors making five claims for liability. 74 The plaintiff contended
that the release did not discharge General Motors from liability be-
cause General Motors was not a party to the settlement and did not
pay any amount of consideration for its release.75
The court found this argument appealing 76 and posed the ques-
tion, "[w]hy should a release paid for by Wilma Roach and/or her
insuror benefit General Motors which not only paid nothing for the
paid for the release, or in any amount or proportion by which the release provides
that the total claim shall be reduced, if greater than the consideration paid.
Id. (emphasis added).
65. 209 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1953).
66. Id. at 104. The judgments were entered in a state court in Arkansas and thus, the
Arkansas Joint Tortfeasor Statute was controlling. Id. at 103-04.
67. Currently codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-61-204 (1987).
68. Allbright, 209 F.2d at 104.
69. 428 F.2d 952 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 904 (1970).
70. Id. Arkansas law was applied because the accident occurred in Arkansas. Id. at 953.
71. Id. at 954.
72. Id. at 952. The release specifically named the driver of the car, Wilma Roach, and
"all other persons, firms or corporations liable or who might be claimed to be liable." Id.
73. Id. at 952-53.
74. Id. The claims were for negligence, strict liability, breach of warranty, wanton mis-
conduct, and fraud/misrepresentation.
75. Id. at 953. Morison and his "settling" attorney also submitted affidavits that they did
not intend to release General Motors. Id.
76. Id. at 953-54.
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release, but probably, did not even know of it until long after-
wards?"77 However, the Fifth Circuit declined to adopt this argu-
ment. Citing policy reasons," the court held that the general
boilerplate language releasing all tortfeasors was clear and satisfied
the requirement of section 34-1004 of the Arkansas Statutes
Annotated.7 9
The Eighth Circuit provided the most recent construction of sec-
tion 16-61-204 in Douglas v. United States Tobacco Co.,s° a decision
similar to the ruling in Morison. Douglas appealed from a district
court decision that a general release executed by the decedent, Ada
Clayborn, discharged all joint tortfeasors,81 including the appellee,
United States Tobacco Company. The plaintiff's contentions for re-
versal were (1) that the general boilerplate did not satisfy the require-
ment of section 34-1004, and (2) that the court erred by failing to
allow parol evidence to prove that the parties did not intend to release
United States Tobacco Company. 2
As to the plaintiff's first contention, the court held that the pol-
icy considerations set forth in Morison were sound: the defendant
who procures the release has nothing to gain if the releasee can pro-
ceed against other joint tortfeasors1 3 As to the claim that parol evi-
dence should be admitted to demonstrate the intent of the parties, the
court reasoned that the phrase, "all other persons, firms, corpora-
tions, associations or partnerships" was clear and unambiguous and
thus, extrinsic evidence was inadmissible.8 4 The court held that the
general release satisfied the requirement of the Arkansas statute.8 5
Moore v. Missouri Pacific Railroad86 involved a case of first im-
pression in Arkansas. The sole issue considered was whether a gen-
77. Id.
78. Id. The court reasoned that the release would never have been executed unless all
tortfeasors were released because Wilma Roach would have lost her right to contribution
against General Motors and would have been open to contribution herself. Id.
79. See supra note 67.
80. 670 F.2d 791 (8th Cir. 1982).
81. Id. at 792. Clayborn developed oral cancer from the use of snuff. He sued his doctor,
R. H. Manley, for failing to properly diagnose his condition, but settled before the trial date.
The settlement consisted of the release of Mary B. Manley, as Administratrix of the Estate of
R. H. Manley, Deceased... and all other persons, firms, corporations, associations or partner-
ships .... Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 794. The court noted that the Arkansas legislature had ample time to respond
to the Morison decision had it thought that it was inconsistent with Arkansas law. Id.
84. Id. at 795.
85. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-61-204 (1987).
86. 299 Ark. 232, 773 S.W.2d 78 (1989).
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eral release discharging "any and all persons, associations and
corporations, whether herein named or referred to or not," was effec-
tive to release potential joint tortfeasors not specifically named or
identified in the release.17 As a preliminary matter, the Arkansas
Supreme Court recounted the history"8 of the common law release
form and its progression through Arkansas' adoption of the
UCATA.8 9
The court's analysis focused on the relevant provisions of the
UCATA found in section 16-61-204 of the Arkansas Code Anno-
tated. It states in part that a release of one joint tortfeasor does not
discharge other joint tortfeasors unless the release so provides. 90 Be-
cause an Arkansas court had not interpreted this provision before, the
supreme court looked to other jurisdictions for guidance. It discov-
ered that in jurisdictions with statutes virtually identical to Arkansas',
three basic approaches existed 91-the "intent" rule,92 the "specific
identity" rule,93 and the "flat-bar" rule.94 The court found the rea-
soning in Beck v. Cianchetti9 s and Alsup v. Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co. 96 the most persuasive.
In a fact situation97 similar to that in Moore, the court in Beck
87. Id. at 232-33, 773 S.W.2d at 78. The trial court granted summary judgment to the
Missouri Pacific Railroad on the basis that the release was effective to discharge all potential
joint tortfeasors. Id.
88. Id. at 234-35, 773 S.w.2d at 79.
89. Id.
90. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-61-204 (1987).
91. 299 Ark. at 236, 773 S.W.2d at 80.
92. See Mclnnis v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 625 F. Supp. 943 (D.R.I. 1986); Hurt v.
Leatherby Ins. Co., 380 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 1980); Flanagan v. State Dept. of Transp., 532 So. 2d
714 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
93. See Alaska Airlines Inc. v. Sweat, 568 P.2d 916 (Alaska 1977); Young v. State, 455
P.2d 889 (Alaska 1969); Alsup v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 101 Ill. 2d 196, 461 N.E.2d
361 (1984); Aid Ins. Co. v. Davis County, 426 N.W.2d 631 (Iowa 1988); Beck v. Cianchetti, 1
Ohio St. 3d 231, 439 N.E.2d 417 (1982); Spector v. K-Mart Corp., 99 A.D.2d 605, 471
N.Y.S.2d 711 (1984); Sage v. Hale, 75 Misc. 256, 347 N.Y.S.2d 416 (Sup. Ct. 1973); Bjork v.
Chrysler Corp., 702 P.2d 146 (Wyo. 1985).
94. See Auer v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., USA, 830 F.2d 535 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
485 U.S. 905 (1988); Douglas v. United States Tobacco Co., 670 F.2d 791 (8th Cir. 1982);
Morison v. General Motors Corp., 428 F.2d 952 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 904 (1970);
Doganieri v. United States, 520 F. Supp. 1093 (N.D. W. Va. 1981); Johnson v. City of Las
Cruces, 86 N.M. 196, 521 P.2d 1037 (Ct. App. 1974); Hasselrode v. Gnagey, 404 Pa. 549, 172
A.2d 764 (1961).
95. 1 Ohio St. 3d 231, 439 N.E.2d 417 (1982).
96. 101 Ill. 2d 196, 461 N.E.2d 361 (1984).
97. The plaintiff was a passenger on a motorcycle which was hit by an automobile. She
executed a release discharging the driver and "all other persons, firms, corporations, associa-
tions or partnerships." Later, she brought suit against a joint tortfeasor who was not a party to
the release. Beck, 1 Ohio St. 3d 231, 439 N.E.2d 417 (1982).
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stated that the legislature apparently intended to change the common
law; otherwise no reason existed to enact the statute.98 The Beck deci-
sion stated that the objective of the UCATA was to retain the liability
of tortfeasors. Therefore the phrase "unless its terms otherwise pro-
vide" must be narrowly construed so as to require a degree of
specificity. 99
In Alsup, also factually similar to Moore,1° the court noted the
strong criticism of the common law rule. 0 ' It reasoned that if it gave
the general language in the release its literal effect and discharged all
tortfeasors, "an important purpose of the Act would be thwarted by
the unintended release of persons who were strangers to the release
contract." 1
0 2
The Arkansas Supreme Court held that it was the "intention of
the Arkansas Legislature in enacting 16-61-204 to abrogate the com-
mon law rule that a release of one tortfeasor released all other
tortfeasors jointly liable for the occurrence, thereby retaining the lia-
bility of joint tortfeasors."' 3 To satisfy the legislative intent, the
court held that the statutory language "unless the release so pro-
vides" '" requires that a release name or otherwise specifically identify
the tortfeasors to be discharged.0 5 Broad boilerplate language is in-
sufficient to release all joint tortfeasors. 10 6
Justices Hickman, Hays, and Glaze dissented from the majority
opinion. 10 7 They argued that the majority ignored Arkansas law re-
quiring that when parties to a contract expressed their intention in
clear and unambiguous language in a written instrument, it is the
court's duty to construe the writing in accordance with the plain
meaning of that language. 10 8 Furthermore, the dissenting justices
98. Id. at 234-35, 439 N.E.2d at 420.
99. Id.
100. The plaintiffs were injured when their car was struck by another vehicle. Subse-
quently, the plaintiffs executed a release to the driver of the second vehicle, discharging him
and "all other persons, firms, and corporations, both known and unknown, of and from any
and all claims." Alsup, 101 Ill. 2d 196, 198, 461 N.E.2d 361, 362 (1984).
101. Id. at 200-01, 461 N.E.2d at 363-64. "It has been described as 'harsh,' 'without any
rational basis,' and 'very unfair.' " Id.
102. Id. at 200-01, 461 N.E.2d at 364.
103. Moore, 299 Ark. at 239, 773 S.W.2d at 82.
104. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-61-204 (1987).
105. 299 Ark. at 239-40, 773 S.W.2d at 82.
106. Id. Under this reasoning, the court concluded that the release executed by the plain-
tiff discharging Mary Richardson was not effective to release Missouri Pacific Railroad or John
Peterson because they were not named or specifically identified in the release. Id. at 240, 773
S.W.2d at 82.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 241, 773 S.W.2d at 83.
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criticized the majority for overlooking "the rule of statutory construc-
tion that statutes in derogation of the common law will be strictly
construed."1 °9 Under a strict construction, the dissenting justices
contended that the boilerplate found in the general release form satis-
fied the statutory language "unless the release so provides."11 The
dissent also recognized that federal courts interpreting the Arkansas
statute have held that general releases satisfy the statutory
requirement. 11'
The dissent agreed that the legislature intended "to abolish the
common law rule that produced an involuntary discharge of joint
tortfeasors upon the release of one tortfeasor,' 12 but believed that the
majority went too far by adopting the "specific identity" rule.113 The
dissent conceded that there may be sound policy behind the majority's
reasoning, 114 but argued that it is not the court's duty to construe the
language of the statute to best conform to the legislature's intent.' 15
On the contrary, the court's duty is "to effectuate the plain intent
expressed in the enactment.""' 6
The court's decision essentially destroys the use of the general
release form, both past and future. All general release forms executed
to date will be ineffective to release those whom the joint tortfeasor
thought he had released. 1 7 To effectuate a release of all tortfeasors
prospectively, every conceivable tortfeasor must be named or identi-
fied in some way. How specific must a description be to satisfy the
court that a tortfeasor has been identified? Only through continued
litigation will this be answered. Does the same incentive remain for
the probable tortfeasor to settle? Absolutely not.
Before the Moore holding, a probable tortfeasor could safely set-
tle with the victim by executing a general release form, discharging all
tortfeasors. Since the Moore decision, contribution deters both the









117. Lindsey, in Documentation of Settlements, 27 ARK. L. REV. 27 (1973), provided a
guide to drafting and executing releases and settlements. He indicated that the Moore holding
was probably the rule in Arkansas. However, on page 32 of the article, he states that the
language, "all other persons, firms or corporations whomsoever," should be used to effectuate
a release of all joint tortfeasors. As the Moore decision illustrates, this language can no longer
be depended on to discharge anyone.
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be read alone-section 16-61-205 must be read with it."'8 A joint
reading reveals that the release of a tortfeasor does not protect him
against contribution unless it releases him from his pro rata share.
Releasing a tortfeasor from his pro rata share is a risky move. If he
has offered in consideration fifty percent of the total injury, but is
released from his pro rata share, it is the pro rata share and not the
consideration paid which will reduce the judgment against the joint
tortfeasor. Thus, if the court finds that the discharged tortfeasor is
ninety percent negligent, the victim loses forty percent of his satisfac-
tion. The alternative is to release the tortfeasor only for consideration
paid. Under this theory, there is no incentive for the tortfeasor to
settle when he is still open to contribution for his comparative fault.
He should take his chances in court.
In short, the policy in Moore is sound: a person not a party to a
settlement, who has paid no consideration should not get the benefit
of the release unless named or specifically identified. However, the
holding created some very real problems. Who will ever be sure that
they sufficiently identified all tortfeasors? Should the victim release a
tortfeasor from his pro rata share and take the risk of less than full
satisfaction? Should the tortfeasor settle without being released of his
pro rata share and open himself to future litigation over contribution?
These questions are sure to be litigated, producing no clear answers.
The only clear answers are fewer releases, fewer settlements, and
more litigation.
Marshall S. Ney
118. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-61-205 (1987) states that:
[a] release by the injured person of one (1) joint tortfeasor does not relieve him from
liability to make contribution to another joint tortfeasor unless the release is given
before the right of the other tortfeasor to secure a money judgment for contribution
has accrued, and provides for a reduction, to the extent of the pro rata share of the
released tortfeasor, of the injured person's damages recoverable against all the other
tortfeasors.
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